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Abstract 
The amount of carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions produced by cars is a linear (albeit fuel specific) function of the amount of fuel 
consumed. Because CO2 emissions generate social costs, through their effect on climate change, which escape the price mecha-
nism, a tax on CO2 is indicated. An ideal tax would alter the consumer prices so that they match the marginal social costs. This 
setting thus calls for a specific tax on fuel equal to the value of externality resulting from the combustion of a unit of fuel. Since 
such tax scheme is readily available, we study to what extent the existing CO2 tax policies make use of it. We find that they do 
only to a limited extent. Thus our policy prescription is to drop existing CO2 taxes and use the existing fuel taxes to adjust fuel 
prices so that they match the marginal social costs related to burning of fuel. 
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1. Introduction 
Motor vehicle movement is also associated with the emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2) – a result of fuel combus-
tion. Unlike toxic emissions from cars that have adverse effects on people living today (Chen, Ebenstein, Green-
stone, and Li 2013; Hoek, Brunekreef, Goldbohm, Fischer, and van den Brandt 2002), particularly children (Arceo-
Gomez, Hanna, and Oliva 2012; Brauer et al. 2002), the effects of increased amount of carbon dioxide work through 
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the costs related to the climate change. They will be borne by future generations. Thus the impossibility of Coasian 
bargaining solution (Calabresi and Melamed 1971; Coase 1960) rests not so much on high transaction costs and 
information problems, rather the fundamental problem is that there is no-one to contract with in the first place—as 
those should ultimately bear the costs are not (yet) alive. As a result, the nature as well as the magnitude of these 
costs is more speculative. 
More specifically, the uncertainty has three sources: (i) the uncertainty related to prediction of climate decades 
from now, as well as the size of the causal effect of human activity in that; (ii) the uncertainty in estimating the fu-
ture costs as well as future resources, technology, and the ability of future societies to cope with those costs—as 
opposed of today's actions; and (iii) the discount rate that should be applied to those costs, which is necessary in 
order determine the appropriate amount of today's investments into the preventive measures—as opposed to com-
pensating the future generations (Pearce 2003; Pindyck 2013a,b; Schelling 2007, 2009; see also Tol 2012).  Howev-
er, the uncertainty does not imply that there should be no policy response.  In addition, even if mean predictions of 
future costs due to climate change were zero, there is a risk of a catastrophic outcome, which calls for a policy re-
sponse (Pindyck 2013a,b; Pindyck and Wang 2013; Posner 2005; Weitzman 2007).1 Thus, we do not discuss the 
explicit value of the carbon dioxide-related externalities generated by motor vehicles, rather we treat that externality 
as a cost and study policies that would lead consumers to choose the socially optimal amount of it. 
2. Background 
As can be seen in Figure 1, CO2 coming from motor gasoline and diesel fuel combustion contribute between 25 
and 30 percent to the total emissions. To the extend these costs do not enter into drivers’ or passengers’ cost func-
tions, the chosen level of driving activity, as well as the amount of pollution produced per kilometer, may be above 
the optimum. This is because the equality between the marginal utility from a driving the next journey with its mar-
ginal costs obtains at a higher level of driving activity than would be justified by the marginal costs of that journey 
born by the society as whole (assuming diminishing marginal utility from travel). This is a blueprint example of an 
externality situation where an appropriate tax may correct the incentives. In a textbook notation we have inequality 
between the private marginal costs ܯܥ and the social marginal costs ܵܯܥ and we are looking for a tax, which 
would equate the two, that isܶ ൌ ܵܯܥ െܯܥ. 
 
Fig. 1. Carbon Dioxide Emissions From Energy Consumption, United States 1949–
2011. Data source: U.S. Department of Energy 2012, Table 11.1. 
As long as a car stays in the garage, it produces zero CO2 emissions (assuming the engine is off). Once it begins 
moving, the marginal externalities are determined by the laws of nature. Specifically, when hydrocarbon burns in 
 
 
1 See, however, Schelling (2007, 4) who recommends us not to “be obsessed with either extreme tail of the distribution”. 
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oxygen the result is mainly water and carbon dioxide. Thus, the amount of CO2 increases linearly in the amount of 
fuel combusted by a car (National Research Council, 2002; U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 2009) and no 
mitigating technologies are available (Parry, Walls, and Harrington 2007). To check this empirically we have esti-
mated a set of OLS models using data on fuel economy and CO2 emissions at a model-engine-year level collected 
by the Vehicle Certification Agency of the United Kingdom Department for Transport. Specifically, denote ݕ௣ǡ௠ǡ௚ǡ௧ 
the amount of CO2 per kilometre produced by a car, where p identifies the producer, m the model, g the engine type, 
and t the year of production, we estimate 
 log ݕ௣ǡ௠ǡ௚ǡ௧ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵlog ܿ௣ǡ௠ǡ௚ǡ௧ ൅ ߚଶ݀௚ ൅ ߚଷlog ܿ௣ǡ௠ǡ௚ǡ௧݀௚ ൅ ࢼ૝ᇱ ࢞࢖ǡ࢓ǡࢍǡ࢚ ൅ ߳௣ǡ௠ǡ௚ǡ௧, (1) 
where ܿ௣ǡ௠ǡ௚ǡ௧is the fuel consumption per 100 kilometres, ݀௚ is a dummy set to 1 if an engine݃ is a diesel and 0 for 
petrol engines and ࢞࢖ǡ࢓ǡࢍǡ࢚ is a vector of additional controls. We estimate four alternative specifications of regression 
(1): the first specification is estimated without any ࢞s; in the second specification we add the year of production and 
its square; in the third specification we add the full set of interactions between the fuel type and year of production 
dummies; and in fourth specification we a add full set of dummies for car producer. Because fuel consumption as 
well as CO2 emissions per kilometer are in logs, ߚଵ and ߚଷ are elasticities while ߚଶ picks up the (approximate) per-
centage difference between the average CO2 per kilometer for cars with petrol engine and cars with diesel engine.2 
Looking at regression (1), one may worry that the residuals are not independent because fuel consumption as well as 
CO2 emissions are measured by car producers; we therefore report standard errors clustered at the producer level, 
allowing for an arbitrary correlation among residuals within individual car producers.  
If the description in previous paragraph is correct, then ߚଵ and ߚଷ should be equal to 1 and 0, respectively, how-
ever this expectation would only be correct if fuel was burned perfectly. In reality, burning is imperfect and there-
fore small portion of carbon is un-oxidized; the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) guidelines state 
the oxidization factor for oil products to be 0.99, that is 99 percent of carbon in the fuel is oxidized (U.S. Environ-
mental Protection Agency 2009). However, that value is likely conservative as modern efficient engines and cleaner 
fuels result in more complete combustion (providing better fuel economy and fewer toxic emissions, which consist 
of the un-oxidized fuel). Thus we expect the true value of ߚଵ to be between 0.99 and 1 and ߚଷ to be between −0.01 
and zero because diesel engines burn fuel slightly less perfectly than petrol engines. 
First four columns of Table 1 report the results. Focusing on the coefficients in the first row which contains our 
four alternative OLS estimates of ߚଵ. All are between 0.98 and 0.99, suggesting that increasing the fuel consumption 
per kilometer by 1 percent results in an increase of CO2 emissions by almost 0.99 percent; very close to the expected 
range of values. As reported at the bottom of Table 1, the hypothesis that ߚଵ= 0.99 is rejected in specifications (1) 
and (2) but not in specifications (3) and (4). Note that the coefficient on the interaction term for diesel cars is sys-
tematically larger than the expected range of values and it is highly statistically significant; suggesting that for the 
subset of diesel cars the elasticity of CO2 emissions with respect to fuel consumption is between 0.94 and 0.97. 
There are reasons, however, to be worried that the OLS estimates suffer from the attenuation bias, i.e. are biased 
towards zero. This is because the fuel consumption is measured with an error and, more importantly, the data on 
consumption are rounded at one decimal point introducing additional measurement error. Note also that the meas-
urement error may be relatively more influential in the case of diesel engine cars; this is because the former have 
substantially lower consumption on average (6.24 versus 8.61 liters per 100 km) resulting in smaller variance 
 
 










which is the elasticity of Y with respect to C (for the subset of cars with petrol engine). Fߚͳor, because ݀݃is a discrete variable, fix ߫ǡ ࣄ א ܀, then 
we can write ߚଶ ൌ ሺܻȁܿ ൌ ߫ǡ ࢞ ൌ ࣄǡ ݀ ൌ ͳሻ െ ሺܻȁܿ ൌ ߫ǡ ࢞ ൌ ࣄǡ ݀ ൌ Ͳሻ, which is approximately the proportional difference be-
tween ሺܻȁǥ݀ ൌ ͳሻ and ሺܻȁǥ݀ ൌ ͲሻǢ the exact proportional difference being୉ሺ௒ȁǥௗୀଵሻି୉ሺ௒ȁǥௗୀ଴ሻ୉ሺ௒ȁǥௗୀ଴ሻ ൌ ݁
ఉమ െ ͳ, but the two quantities are 
similar for small ߚs as limఉ՜଴ ߚ ൌ݁ఉమ െ ͳ. 
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(standard deviations are 1.57 and 2.46, for diesel and petrol cars, respectively). Therefore the (same) measurement 
error would take up a larger share on variance of fuel consumption in the case of diesel cars.  
 
Table 1. Carbon dioxide emissions and fuel economy 
   OLS   IV 
   (1) (2) (3) (4)   (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Log fuel economy  0.982 0.985 0.989 0.987 0.993 0.994 0.995 0.998 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Year  −0.004 −0.004 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Year2  0.0004 0.0004 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Diesel ൈ  
 Log fuel economy  −0.043 −0.029 −0.022 −0.023 −0.015 −0.010 −0.010 −0.011 
 (0.008) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) 
 Year  −0.009 −0.01 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
 Year2  0.001 0.001 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Diesel (= 1)  0.187 0.179 0.156 0.156 0.140 0.146 0.135 0.138 
 (0.015) (0.014) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.009) (0.008) 
Constant  3.213 3.214 3.200 3.200 3.189 3.193 3.186 3.174 
   (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006)   (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006) 
Years ൈ Fuel  – – Yes Yes – – Yes Yes 
Make  – – – Yes   – – – Yes 
Observations  26 450 26 450 26 450 26 450 26 450 26 450 26 450 26 450 
Adjusted R2  0.986 0.987 0.991 0.991   0.985 0.986 0.99 0.991 
Test: Log economy = 0.99  
          t-statistic  −3.043 −2.159 −0.703 −1.328   1.418 2.037 2.690 3.435 
Note: Huber-White standard errors clustered on car producers are in parentheses; clustered standard errs for IV 
estimates were estimated using formulas in Shore-Sheppard (1996). Unit of observation Shore-Sheppard (1996). 
Unit of observation is at the car type-year level. Fuel economy in IV models is instrumented by engine displace-
ment, its interaction with dummy for diesel engines, and the rest of explanatory variables in each specification. 
Engine displacement and the interaction are the instruments excluded in the second stage. First stage estimates 
are reported in Table A1 in the appendix. Data source: the Vehicle Certification Agency, the United Kingdom 
Department for Transport. 
 
In order to address the issue of measurement error we estimated a 2SLS model, instrumenting the fuel consump-
tion with engine displacement, denoted e.3 Specifically, we have estimated a system of two regressions: In the first 
stage we regress fuel consumption on engine displacement, the dummy for diesel, and its interaction with engine 
displacement, plus the rest of xs 
 log ܿ௣ǡ௠ǡ௚ǡ௧ ൌ ߙ଴ ൅ ߙଵlog ݁௣ǡ௠ǡ௚ǡ௧ ൅ ߙଶ݀௚ ൅ ߙଷlog ݁௣ǡ௠ǡ௚ǡ௧݀௚ ൅ ࢻ૝ᇱ ࢞࢖ǡ࢓ǡࢍǡ࢚ ൅ ߝ௣ǡ௠ǡ௚ǡ௧. (2) 
First stage estimates are reported in Table A1 in the appendix. Using the data and the estimated parameters from 
regression (2) we get the predicted values of ܿ, denoted Ƹܿ, that is 
 
 
3 See Ashenfelter and Krueger (1994) for a classic application of IV strategy to deal with attenuation bias. 
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 log Ƹܿ௣ǡ௠ǡ௚ǡ௧ ൌ ߙො଴ ൅ ߙොଵlog ݁௣ǡ௠ǡ௚ǡ௧ ൅ ߙොଶ݀௚ ൅ ߙොଷlog ݁௣ǡ௠ǡ௚ǡ௧݀௚ ൅ ࢻෝ૝ᇱ ࢞࢖ǡ࢓ǡࢍǡ࢚Ǥ (3) 
Finally we replace ܿ by Ƹܿ in regression (1) and estimate 
The exclusion restriction for this IV model requires that engine displacement does not affect CO2 except through 
engine displacement. This appears to be satisfied as long as CO2 emissions depend only on fuel consumption. We 
estimated the IV model for our four specifications. Reported standard errors are again clustered at the car producer 
level and were computed according to the results in Shore-Sheppard (1996).4 
The results are reported in columns (5) through (8) of Table 1. Compared with the OLS estimates, the IV coeffi-
cients on fuel consumption are about one log point higher and never below 0.99. This is the expected result; the 
difference between IV and OLS estimates is consistent with attenuation bias in OLS due to measurement error. Tests 
whether ߚଵ = 0.99 do not reject in specifications (5) and (6) but do in (7) and (8).  
A more dramatic change occurs in the case of the coefficients on the interaction between fuel consumption and 
the dummy for diesel engines. The estimates of ߚଷ fall by approximately two log points and only in two case are 
statistically significant at the 5 percent level (although they are all significant at the 10 percent level), which is a 
substantial change in comparison with the OLS estimates. This, again, is an expected result if the attenuation bias 
was more severe in the case of diesel engine cars. Note also that the coefficient on the dummy for diesel engine 
suggests that diesel engines produce between 13.5 to 14.6 log points more CO2 per unit of fuel compared to fuel 
engines, the proportional difference in CO2 emissions per unit off between diesel and petrol is 0.144 (in logs we 
have logሾͲǤͳͶͶ ൅ ͳሿ ൈ ͳͲͲ ൌ ͳ͵Ǥͷሻ. 
To summarize, it is reasonable to believe the elasticity of CO2 emissions with respect to fuel consumption is be-
tween 0.99 and 1, and this holds for petrol as well as, although less precisely, for diesel engines. This implies that 
increasing fuel consumption by 1 percent result in close to one 1 increase of CO2 emissions. 
3. The Model 
3.1. The setup 
Automobile-related CO2 pollution, at the individual car level, can be described as a function of three variables: 
activity, that is kilometers driven, denotedܽ; fuel consumption per kilometer, denotedܿ; and the amount of emis-
sions per combusted unit of fuel, denoted݁. Let ݅be a car identifier, the discussion above implies that ݁௜varies only 
with the fuel type, thus it can be denoted ௙݁, where ݂ is a fuel identifier. Let the units of ௙݁ be normalized so that 
their monetary value is equal to one Euro. Then the value of the externality, denoted ݒ, produced by car ݅ is simply 
 
 
4 Specifically, let ࢄ be the matrix of explanatory variables (including the intercept) from regression (1) and ࢆ be the matrix of instruments 
(including the non-excluded ࢞s from the second stage) from regression (2), then the estimate of the variance-covariance matrix of ࢼcan be 
obtained from the sandwich estimator var൫ࢼ෡൯ ൌ ሾࢄᇱࢆሺࢆᇱࢆሻି૚ࢆᇱࢄሿି૚ࢄᇱࢆሺࢆᇱࢆሻି૚ࢆᇱષࢆሺࢆᇱࢆሻି૚ࢆᇱࢄሾࢄᇱࢆሺࢆᇱࢆሻି૚ࢆᇱࢄሿି૚ ൬
௣՜ varሺࢼሻ൰. The meat 
matrix can be estimated usingࢆᇱષ෡ࢆ ൌ ܽσ ࢆ࢖ᇱ ࣕ࢖ࣕ࢖ᇱ ࢆ࢖௣ ቀ
௣՜ ࢆᇱષࢆቁ  (Shore-Sheppard 1996; Söderbom 2011; White 1980; see also Davidson and 
MacKinnon 2003, chap. 5.5 and 8.5), that is for each producer the transformed subset of ݌’s ࢆ, a ݇ ൈ ݊௣matrixࢆ࢖ᇱ , is multiplied with ݌’s 
݊௣ ൈ݊௣covariance matrix of residuals and a ݊௣ ൈ ݇matrixࢄ࢖, where ݇ is the number of explanatory variables,  ݊௣ denotes the number of cars 
from producer ݌ in the data, and ܽ is a degrees of freedom correction factor obtained asܽ ൌ  ௠௠ିଵ
௡ିଵ
௡ି௞, where ݉ is the number of car producers in 
the data and ݊ is the number of observations. The result is ݉ of݇ ൈ ݇ matrices, one matrix for each producer, sum of which is the estimate 
ofࢆᇱષࢆ. Taking the square root of the vector of diagonal elements ofvar൫ࢼ෡൯ yields the estimate of clustered standard errors for coefficients 
from regression (4). 
 log ݕ௣ǡ௠ǡ௚ǡ௧ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵlog Ƹܿ௣ǡ௠ǡ௚ǡ௧ ൅ ߚଶ݀௚ ൅ ߚଷlog Ƹܿ௣ǡ௠ǡ௚ǡ௧݀௚ ൅ ࢼ૝ᇱ ࢞࢖ǡ࢓ǡࢍǡ࢚ ൅ ߳௣ǡ௠ǡ௚ǡ௧. (4) 
 ݒ௜ ൌ  ܽ௜ܿ௜ ௙݁ (5) 
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Euro, where ܽ௜ܿ௜  is the total fuel consumption by car ݅. Note that fuel consumption is allowed to vary within cars as 
individual-level factors, such as driving style, load, cold start, or urban and extra-urban driving, do affect it (see 
Stock 2004). As a result, two identical cars will have different fuel consumption, unless they are driven under same 
conditions. Allowing fuel consumption to be a choice variable is a conceptual difference from the existing literature, 
which treats fuel consumption as fixed by car design (Fischer, Harrington, and Parry 2007; Fullerton and West 
2002; Innes 1996; Parry and Small 2005). Driver’s behavior thus affects the total externality through three channels,  
However, ݀ ௙݁ is different from zero only when the driver is choosing her car, once she has one in possession, equa-
tion (6) simplifies to 
stating that the marginal externality depends on the change in total fuel consumption, which can come from two 
sources, the change in kilometers driven and the change in fuel consumption.  
3.2. The policy response 
Let ݌௙ be the price of fuel ݂, then the marginal social costs from increasing the total fuel consumption by car ݅ by 
an additional liter are ݌௙ ൅ ௙݁, however the private marginal costs are ݌௙ so we are looking for a tax, denoted ݐ, 
which satisfies 
and so it is 
This tax would thus price the marginal externalities from driving along two important margins, the distance travelled 
and the fuel consumption giving people appropriate incentives for optimizing the two quantities.  
3.3. Why is fuel tax so good? 
If the tax is set at the optimum level, that isݐ ൌ ௙݁, it sets the right incentives to choose the socially optimal dis-
tance travelled as well as fuel consumption. However, does the tax give the people incentives to choose vehicles that 
are optimal from the social point of view? Two margins are relevant with respect to CO2 emissions: (i) car size and 
engine efficiency to the extent they affect fuel consumption and (ii) fuel type, as fuel efficiency as well as CO2 
emissions per litre of fuel differ across fuel types. The effect of vehicle choice on fuel efficiency is already taken 
care of by our fuel tax—but is the same true with respect to the choice of the fuel type?  
Since fuel type is a discrete variable, we can rewrite equation (6) as 
The social marginal costs are now ݀ሺܽ௜ܿ௜ሻ൫݌௙ ൅ ௙݁൯ ൅ ܽ௜ܿ௜൫ȟ݌௙ ൅ ȟ ௙݁൯ , while private marginal costs are 
ly݀ሺܽ௜ܿ௜ሻ݌௙ ൅ ܽ௜ܿ௜ȟ݌௙, that is a sum of the effect of total fuel consumption and the effect of changing fuel type on 
private and social costs of driving. Thus we need a tax, denote it ݐ௙, which would satisfy  
Let ݐ௙ ൌ ݐ, then ݐ ൌ ௙݁ ฺ ȟݐ ൌ ȟ ௙݁ ฺ ȟݐ௙ ൌ ȟ ௙݁, which is what we need.  
 ݀ݒ௜ ൌ ݀ܽ௜ܿ௜ ௙݁ ൅ ݀ܿ௜ܽ௜ ௙݁ ൅ ݀ ௙݁ܽ௜ܿ௜. (6) 
 ݀ݒ௜ ൌ  ሺ݀ܽ௜ܿ௜ ൅ ݀ܿ௜ܽ௜ሻ ௙݁, (7) 
 ݌௙ ൅ ݐ ൌ ݌௙ ൅ ௙݁, (8) 
 ݐ ൌ ௙݁. (9) 
 ȟݒ௜ ൌ ݀ሺܽ௜ܿ௜ሻ ௙݁ ൅ ȟ ௙݁ܽ௜ܿ௜. (10) 
 ݀ሺܽ௜ܿ௜ሻ൫݌௙ ൅ ௙݁൯ ൅ ܽ௜ܿ௜൫ȟ݌௙ ൅ ȟ ௙݁൯ ൌ ݀ሺܽ௜ܿ௜ሻ൫݌௙ ൅ ݐ௙൯ ൅ ܽ௜ܿ௜൫ȟ݌௙ ൅ ȟݐ௙൯Ǥ (11) 
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Thus a fuel tax gives people also correct incentives to choose the fuel type, on top of incentives to select a car 
with optimum fuel economy, drive optimum number of kilometers, and choose the optimum fuel consumption. In 
addition, because the valuation of driving, fuel type, and car amenities vary across individuals, while the marginal 
externality is the same for all, fuel tax gives each person incentives to behave optimally from the social point of 
view, yet fully in accordance with their individual preferences and means. 
4. The policies in place 
  Most common policies that bear CO2-emissions in name are registration and annual car taxes (or bonuses). Ta-
ble A2 in the Appendix summarizes the prevalence of these schemes in the EU countries. Out of 27 EU countries, 
13 have a one-time car registration tax and 15 have an annual car tax (nine countries have both). While the specific 
tax designs differ, the size of all these taxes are (co-)determined by CO2 emissions. Such taxes, however, affect the 
marginal costs of car ownership (per year), rather than the marginal costs of emitting CO2—once paid they become 
a sunk cost and thus are irrelevant with respect to decisions whether to drive an additional journey, or whether to 
save on fuel consumption or not. In addition, while these taxes give people incentives to buy fuel efficient cars, the 
related savings on fuel as well as savings on the car tax itself after a car is bought represent a positive income shock. 
This may increase the number of kilometers driven and weaken incentives to save on fuel consumption. As a result, 
at least part of the positive effects of these taxes on CO2 emissions gets crowded out. These taxes are thus hardly 
optimal with respect giving correct incentives to curb CO2 emissions.5  
 Shifting attention to our policy of choice, Figure 2 plots the specific taxes on fuel across the EU countries. Ex-
cise duties on alcohol, tobacco, and energy products are harmonized in the EU so that there are EU-wide minimum 
rates (European Commission 2003). Although this tax is an ideal one for taxing the CO2-related externalities, the 
 
 
5 One may be tempted to argue, that these taxes are not true CO2 taxes, rather they put price on different externalities that depend on car size 
or fuel consumption per kilometer (toxic emissions, congestion, accidents, and fuel dependence). For this argument to be correct, such externali-
ties would need to depend on car ownership, its size, or fuel economy, but not on the number of kilometers driven or total fuel consumption. We 
suggest that this is hardly the case, for as long as the car is in the garage the related externalities are close to, if not exactly, zero. 
  
Fig. 2. Excise duties of fuels in the EU as of 1 January 2013 (calculations are based on exchange rates from 18 March 2013). Data 
source: European Commission 2013.  
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directive only mentions that taxation of energy products is one of the instruments for achieving the Kyoto Protocol 
objectives (European Comission 2003, par. 7). 
Can the fuel tax be realistically the primary policy addressing the costs related to CO2 emissions from driving? 
One may worry that imposing additional fuel taxes would damage EU economies. This is a problematic argument 
for three reasons: (i) should the same goals be achieved by different means, the effects on the economy would be 
probably worse, since fuel tax is very close to first best policy (of taxing emissions directly); (ii) the policy we pro-
pose would indeed require an international coordination (i.e. we do not want tax competition for CO2-related fuel 
taxes), but so would alternatives—and we believe that, in the case of fuel tax, it is a comparatively less ambitious 
requirement; (iii) it is not implied that a new tax should be imposed on top of the existing ones, since the existing 
fuel taxes already are taxing CO2 emissions as well as other externalities; thus the implied fuel taxes may be higher 
or lower than the existing ones. 
What would the CO2-related fuel tax rates be? Table 3 summarizes the most often cited estimates of social costs 
per ton of CO2, and translates them into today’s prices. The range of estimates is rather wide, starting at $20 per ton 
(Nordhaus 2007), through $50, which is an upper bound in Tol’s (2005) meta-analysis of 103 estimates from 28 
studies, up to $311 in Stern’s (2007) influential book (all estimates in 2005 USD). However, the main source of 
variation in these estimates does not come from differences in methodologies; rather studies differ in their assump-
tions (Pindyck 2013a; Stern 2013). Notably the choice of the discount rate on future consumption has (an exponen-
tial) impact on the estimates (Nordhaus 2007; Pindyck 2013a; Stern 2008; Tol 2005). A more recent estimate in a 
general equilibrium framework by Nordhaus (2011) puts the social costs of ton of CO2 at $12 (in 2005 USD).  
 
Table 2. Estimates of CO2-related social costs per litre of fuel 
 
 Estimates of social cost per tona of CO2  CO2 grams per liter
b 
USD 2005  20c 50d 311e  Gasoline 2322 
Euro 2005f  16.13 40.32 250.81  Diesel 2664 
Euro 2013g  18.91 47.28 294.06    
 
 Social cost per liter in 2013 Euro    
Petrol  0.05 0.12 0.75    
Diesel  0.06 0.14 0.86    
Notes: aOne ton equals 907.185 Kg. bData source: U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency 2009. cNordhaus (2007). dUpper bound, Tol (2005). eStern 
(2007), assuming 1 percent discount rate. fAverage exchange rate in 2005 was 
0.804 Euro per one USD (ECB). gThe 2013/2005 inflation rate in the Eurozone 
was 17.25 percent (Eurostat). 
 
Taking Tol’s (2005, 2073) upper bound estimate of $50 as the marginal social costs of emissions of one ton of 
CO2, the implied carbon tax is 12 Euro cents per liter of petrol and 14 per liter of diesel. Since the EU minimum 
harmonized rates are 36 and 33 cents for petrol and diesel, respectively, it is fully feasible that fuel tax be used to 
fully internalize CO2-related externalities. Taking into account other externalities (oil dependence, local pollution, 
congestion, and accidents), sum of which Parry, Walls, and Harrington (2007, 384) estimated at $2.22 per gallon (in 
2005 USD), which gives 55.3 Euro cents per liter of fuel in 2013 prices, the implied fuel tax is approximately 60 
Euro cents per liter. This estimate must be taken with a grain of salt. Taken at face value it suggests that the EU 
minimum rates should rise by 2/3 for petrol and by about 90 percent for diesel. This would however allow removal 
of the registration and annual car taxes. 
5. Conclusion 
We have developed and shown a strong case for fuel tax as the ideal policy for correcting relative prices in order 
to internalize the social costs related to CO2 emissions. This is because (i) the amount of CO2 emissions depends 
linearly, and solely, on the amount of fuel burned, thus fuel tax prices all relevant decision margins and gives indi-
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viduals and other entities, such as car producers, incentives for socially optimal decisions; (ii) fuel tax is simple and 
easy to administer, making it a good candidate for a policy on which countries may coordinate. While we are not the 
first to point this out (see Nordhaus 2007), the apparent mismatch between the existing policies and this prescription 
suggests that public authorities have not been very attentive. We would begin by changing the labels of specific 
taxes so that they match the externalities they put price on. Specifically, we suggest that fuel consumption taxes be 
called “carbon and pollution” taxes. 
Appendix A.  
Table A1. First stage estimates of IV models in Table (1) 
   (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Log engine displacement  0.572 0.569 0.568 0.575 
 (0.029) (0.028) (0.028) (0.037) 
Year  −0.001 
   (0.003)   
Year2  −0.002 
 (0.0003) 
Diesel ൈ  
 Log engine displacement  0.252 0.224 0.216 0.217 
 (0.052) (0.049) (0.048) (0.045) 
 Year  0.032 
 (0.006) 
 Year2  -0.002 
 (0.0005) 
Diesel (= 1)  −2.235 −2.089 −1.977 −1.992 
 (0.388) (0.375) (0.370) (0.348) 
Constant  −2.241 −2.136 −2.111 −2.132 
   (0.218) (0.207) (0.207) (0.283) 
Years ൈ Fuel  – – Yes Yes 
Make  – – – Yes 
Observations  6 450 26 450 26 450 26 450 
Adjusted R2  0.765 0.826 0.835 0.868 
Note: Huber-White standard errors clustered on car producers are in paren-
theses. Unit of observation is at the car type-year level. Models report first 
stage regressions for IV specifications (5) through (8) in Table 1; fuel 
economy is instrumented by engine displacement, its interaction with 
dummy for diesel engines, and the rest of explanatory variables in each 
specification. Data source: the Vehicle Certification Agency, the United 
Kingdom Department for Transport. 
 
 Table A2. CO2-related vehicle taxes in the EU 
 
Registration tax  





Austria     Yes 
Belgium  Yes   Yesa 
Bulgaria      
Cyprus  Yes   Yes 
Czech Republic      
Denmark  Yes   Yes 
Estonia      
Finland  Yes   Yes 
France  Yes   Yesa 
Germany     Yes 
Greece     Yes 
Hungary      
Ireland  Yes   Yes 
Italy      
Latvia  Yes    
Lithuania      
Luxembourg     Yes 
Malta  Yes   Yes 
Netherlands  Yes   Yes 
Poland      
Portugal  Yes   Yes 
Romania  Yes    
Slovakia      
Slovenia  Yes    
Spain  Yes    
Sweden     Yes 
United Kingdom     Yes 
Note: aCompany car tax. Data source: European Automobile 
Manufacturers Association 2013. 
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